Audit firm rotation - its impact on auditor independence: an irish perspective by Coyle, Deirdre
Department of Business Studies
Letterkenny Institute of Technology
Audit Firm Rotation - Its Impact on Auditor
Independence: An Irish Perspective
Author: Deirdre Coyle
Date: August 2010
Research Supervisor: Ms. Anne Burke
This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of MA in Accounting, Letterkenny Institute of Technology.
Declaration
i
DECLARATION
Disclaimer 1
“I hereby certify that this material, submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
of the Master of Arts in Accounting programme is entirely my own work, unless cited
and acknowledged within the text as the work of another.”
Signed ……………………………….
Disclaimer 2
“I hereby agree that this dissertation may be used by the Letterkenny Institute of
Technology for teaching future Masters programmes.”
Signed ……………………………….
Word Count
“I hereby confirm the word count of this dissertation to be 16,321 words excluding
abstracts, diagrams, tables, appendices and references.”
Signed ………………....……………
Abstract
ii
Abstract
Auditor independence is a cornerstone of the auditing profession and recent
challenges of the audit independence assumption have impelled the accounting
profession to consider ways of improving the credibility of audit reports. This study
examines the perceived impact of audit tenure on auditor independence and whether
audit firm rotation should be introduced in Ireland. The associated benefits and
drawbacks of the audit firm rotation are analysed, and possible recommendations for
improvements to potentially further enhance an auditor’s independence are suggested.
The results, based on a survey of the top 20 accounting firms and interviews with 3 of
the Irish accounting bodies and two audit regulators, shows that audit firm rotation
could be an excellent way to enhance the perceptions of an auditor’s independence.
However, it was found that the associated benefits would not outweigh the costs of
having this as a requirement. The findings would also suggest that there is a need to
develop alternative measures to safeguard auditors’ independence, as there are
evidently some weaknesses within the standards that are in place today, otherwise,
none of the corporate scandals would have occurred. Further research should be
considered regarding other possible recommendations for enhancing the independence
of auditors. Some examples include, appointment of company auditors by the state or
an independent oversight body, reducing the 10% fee threshold that an auditor must
not exceed in relation to audit and non-audit services. Another possible enhancement
for independence would be to introduce a government approved body to verify the
auditors’ work year after year to ensure they are carrying out their duties to their full
capability.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Recent accounting scandals, including Enron, WorldCom and Qwest have brought
about substantial change in the audit industry, most notably the dissolution of Arthur
Anderson (Certified Public Accountants), the auditor for the collapsed company,
Enron, in 2002. The scenario has become all too common where a large, publicly
traded corporation receives an unqualified report from an auditor, and shortly
thereafter collapses with the news that the financial statements are grossly misstated
(Tackett et al, 2004). Why and how does this occur time and time again? Is it due to
the procedure by which companies are audited, as auditing is perceived by many users
as having a purpose of detecting accounting irregularities and mistakes or is there
something else at play here? Such are the questions going through the minds of the
public and regulatory community (Comunale and Sexton, 2005).
There has yet to be a major accounting scandal to be brought to light in Ireland,
however, there have been questions surrounding the work of auditors recently in the
current financial crisis, mainly in the banking sector. For example, in the case of Anglo
Irish Bank, there have been questions raised around Ernst & Young’s performance as
they ‘failed to notice’ the substantial loans that were hidden from their Balance Sheet.
Ernst & Young have defended its handling of the bank's accounts; saying all of the
audits they have conducted for the bank's shareholders were done 'in accordance with
the appropriate auditing standards' (Irish Times, August 2009). This brings us to the
question as to whether the standards need to be developed even further in order to
clamp down on such scandals before they can happen and help make the auditors’ role
more efficient.
Porter et al (2008) describes an external audit as an examination of an entity’s financial
statements to provide evidence supporting the information contained in those
statements. If users of the financial statements are to believe and rely on the auditor’s
opinion, it is essential that the auditor is, and is perceived to be, independent of the
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entity, its management and all other influences. If the auditors are considered not to be
independent of the client, their opinion will carry little credibility and users of the
financial statements will gain little, if any, assurance from the auditor’s report about
the truth and fairness (or otherwise) of the financial statements. As a consequence, the
audit will have little purpose or value.
In order to enhance the perceptions of auditor independence and the credibility of their
function, regulators such as the Auditing Practice Board (APB) and the accounting
profession have established measures designed to ensure that auditors are, and remain,
independent of their audit client (Porter et al 2008). The APB was established in April
2002, as part of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), and currently requires the
rotation of audit engagement partners and their review partners as an attempt to
improve attitudes towards the independence of auditors.
The APB is continuously attempting to develop their standards to add value to the
audit function. They also draw attention to the dangers posed to that independence,
particularly as a result of auditors becoming too familiar with their audit clients’
managements, and being dependent on those managements for their continued
appointment (Porter at al, 2008).
This requirement of simply rotating personnel has been questioned by many whether it
is enough to protect the familiarity threat that auditors face (Arel et al, 2005). Due to
the numerous unexpected collapses in the corporate world, many have suggested a
number of different proposals in order to reduce the level of threats auditors face
today, one being the introduction of mandatory audit firm rotation.
Cameran et al (2005) claims that the introduction of mandatory audit partner rotation is
a means of strengthening independence, reducing the incidence of audit failure and
improving the quality of audits. Regulators require auditor rotation out of concern that
long tenure may erode auditor independence and/or hinder the auditor’s ability to
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develop creative and innovative audit programmes due to complacency or over-
familiarity (Carey and Simnett, 2006; cited by Bamber and Bamber, 2008). Due to the
long association an auditor may have with the client, it may have the effect of reducing
the fresh point of view that auditors should have in the first years of the engagement.
The requirement of firm rotation can also lead the market to competition based on the
quality of services, which can lead to a growth in the number of competent firms.
Currently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the United States (US) mandates the
rotation of audit partners. However, in 2003 they required the General Accountability
Office (GAO) to carry out a study on the ‘Potential Effects of Mandatory Audit Firm
Rotation’. This found that firm rotation might not be the most efficient way to
strengthen auditor independence and improve audit quality. On the other hand, they
suggested additional future research could potentially add value to the prospect of
mandatory audit firm rotation.
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives
The research question is:
What impact would audit firm rotation have if it was introduced in Ireland; and
would such audit firm rotation add value to an auditor’s independence?
The research objectives include:
- To outline the literature regarding auditor rotation and its link with auditor
independence.
- To examine legislation/regulations from different countries who have
introduced compulsory audit firm rotation.
- To establish the arguments for and against making firm rotation mandatory.
- To ascertain opinions regarding the impact that audit firm rotation may have if
it was mandated in Ireland.
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- To identify possible recommendations that could enhance the perceptions of
the auditors’ independence in the future.
The first, second and third research objectives were answered by the literature review
which is outlined in chapter two; however, the views of the accounting bodies and
firms were also used to answer objective three. The fourth objective was aimed at
ascertaining the views of the interested parties on how the requirement should be
implemented and what they believed to be the pros and cons of introducing it in
Ireland. This was also analysed from the review of the literature, along with objective
five, of which the interviewees also gave their personal perceptions on how an
auditor’s independence could be enhanced.
1.3 Justification for the research
The evolution of the auditing sector has been a subject of interest for the past number
of years. With corporate scandals blackening the auditing sector, much emphasis has
been placed on improving the current ethical standards. It has been questioned whether
these regulations are enough to overcome the many threats that can arise, or whether
further regulatory changes, such as a system of mandatory audit firm rotation is
needed. Many interested parties have suggested this, as it would not permit audit
personnel to develop a close relationship with clients over time. There has been a call
for further research on this topic by both the international standard setters and
academics (GAO 2003; Nagy, 2005; Jackson et al, 2008).
In addition, the researcher found no previous peer reviewed studies on audit firm
rotation in Ireland, therefore, this study attempts to bridge the gap left in the research
by ascertaining the views of the stakeholders concerned with the auditing profession
on how to enhance independence in Ireland. The findings from this study can then be
compared with the findings of similar studies conducted in other countries around the
world.
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1.4 Potential uses of this study
Firstly, the Irish accounting bodies and regulators could use this research, as needed to
facilitate recommendations produced for enhancing an auditor’s independence. The
accounting bodies are there to offer their members support and information, such as
advising them on any independence issues that may arise. This research will offer them
possible suggestions on how an auditor can improve their independence.
Accountings firms may also use this research; particularly firms which may have felt
the negative effect of the many corporate collapses that have occurred and these were
deemed to have occurred due to independence issues.
This research may be of value to several parties, and the results of this research will be
important for the progression of the accounting industry. In completing the research, it
was hoped to add to the current academic body of knowledge, by reviewing it from an
Irish context.
1.5 Limitations of the Research
“As with any study, there are factors that limit general application of the results”
(Nickerson, 1993, p.30). This research has several limitations, many of which stem
from the constraints of the research. The researcher had the following constraints:
- Interview constraints: The use of interviews for data collection also entailed
certain constraints, mainly the fact that they were mostly conducted via
telephone which meant that it was impossible to read any facial expressions or
body language that can sometimes add to the replies of the interviewees
(Opdenakker, 2006). Another interview constraint was that many of the
interviewees made it clear that their responses were their personal
interpretations and did not represent those of the organisation. In addition to
this, one of the main accounting bodies were unavailable for an interview at the
time of the research, however, this was overcome by the questionnaire due to
the fact that the majority of the respondents from this were affiliated with the
unavailable accounting body.
- Questionnaire constraints: The main limitations associated with the use of
questionnaires include the following factors: the researcher is never sure who
completed the questionnaire nor are they sure that the respondent was not
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frivolous when completing the questionnaire. Both these issues have the
potential to affect the credibility of the findings. Questionnaires prevent the
exploration of the meanings that lie beneath the responses, while the answers
provided may have influenced the participants contributing to researcher bias.
Additional comments boxes were associated with each question to allow the
respondent to add further comments on each of the questions so that these
could be taken into account when appraising the responses.
- Time: Undertaking the research, while also studying full-time, limited the time
available to interview every concerned stakeholder on the area. To counteract
this time constraint, a questionnaire was issued to the ‘Top 20’ accounting
firms in an attempt to ascertain the perceptions of a broader population on the
topic audit firm rotation.
- Financial: This study was privately funded which meant that any extra costs
associated with the collection of the primary and secondary research where
incurred by the researchers. To overcome this constraint, it was decided to
deliver the questionnaires using an online survey tool to eliminate the costs of
postage and conducting the interviews by telephone and via email to reduce the
cost of travelling.
1.6 Chapters outline
A review of the literature on auditor independence and the rotation requirement is
provided in chapter two. The research methodology is outlined in detail in chapter
three and the findings and analysis of the semi-structured interviews and
questionnaires are described in chapter four. Finally, the conclusions and
recommendations are discussed in chapter five.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the current academic literature on the audit rotation requirement
and in particular it looks at auditor’s independence, the APB’s ethical standards and
legislation from other countries regarding the rotation of auditors. It also evaluates
both the positive and negative outcomes of audit rotation.
2.2 Auditor Independence
Auditor independence has been defined as the ability to resist client pressure (Pany and
Reckers 1980, Pearson and Ryan 1982, Knapp, 1985, cited by Strohm, 2005).
Similarly, the APB (Standards and Guidelines, 2008; pg 6) defines auditor
independence as having:
“... freedom from situations and relationships which make it probable that a
reasonable and informed third party would conclude that objectivity either is impaired
or could be impaired”.
Independence is traditionally regarded as being one of the fundamental principles
underlying the reliability of an auditor’s report. An auditors’ report would not be
deemed credible and investors and creditors would have little confidence in it, if
auditors were not independent in both fact and appearance (Alleyne and Devonish,
2006; Arens et al, 2006; Beattie et al, 1999).
The independence of auditors has been a major concern for some time. In recent years,
it has become even more distinctive, given the collapse of Enron, which resulted in the
closure of Arthur Andersen, one of the major international accounting firms (Vinten,
2003; cited by Law, 2008). Andersen’s audit of Enron may have been the most notable
failure of auditor independence, but it was by no means the first, the largest, or the last
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(Moore et al, 2006). Enron was a very important client of Andersen’s, and due to its
long association with the company, Andersen’s auditors failed to uncover the
wrongdoing that went on at Enron as soon as it had occurred (Tackett et al, 2004;
Toffler, B.L, 2005).
People rely extensively on the advice of experts. Often, these experts face conflicts of
interest between their own self-interest and their professional obligation to provide
good advice. A central concern in the Enron post-mortem has been to explain why
Enron’s auditor, Arthur Anderson, failed to act as an independent gatekeeper of
reliable and transparent financial information (Kershaw, 2006; Moore et al, 2006).
To be credible, an auditor’s opinion must be based on an objective and disinterested
assessment of whether the financial statements are presented fairly in conformity with
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). If this is complied with to the
auditor’s best ability, this, in turn, will mean that users will have more confidence in
audited financial statements and that there will be greater certainty in the capital
markets (Firth, 1978, Estes & Reimer, 1977, cited by Firth, 1980).
Ernst & Young became the latest auditors to come under fire after “the court-
appointed examiner in the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc bankruptcy said the audit
firm did not challenge accounting gimmicks that allowed Lehman to hide some $50
billion in assets in 2008, while claiming it had reduced its overall leverage levels”
(The Economic Times, 2010). Also, Richard P. Scalzo, of PWC, was Tyco
International’s lead auditor for many years and has been barred from working on any
part of a public company’s finances as he had been overlooking material facts in his
audit of Tyco. Investigators were left wondering how Tyco's auditor for eight years,
could have “missed the hundreds of millions of dollars in unreported, misappropriated
and misrepresented compensation doled out among Tyco higher-ups during the tenure
of ex-Chairman L. Dennis Kozlowski” (Weinberg, 2003).
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These revelations brought the accounting profession under the scrutiny of many
regulators including the APB and Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory
Authority (IAASA). The scrutiny increased after apparent audit failures were reported
at WorldCom, Xerox, Global Crossing and more recently Lehman Brothers Holdings
Inc. Lawmakers believe that the accounting profession has failed to regulate itself in a
manner that promotes confidence in the published financial statements of public
corporations (Tackett et al, 2004).
In light of these scandals, Congress in the US passed the SOX Act to prescribe new
requirements and restrictions for auditors of publicly traded companies (Congress of
the United States of America, 2002). Although there have been no comparable
failures, brought forward as of yet in the United Kingdom (UK) or Ireland, where the
regulatory framework has been claimed to be more robust (Hinks, 2002), public
reassurance was needed. The UK Government rapidly instigated reviews of key
aspects of the UK regulatory framework and a key concern was highlighted regarding
the adequacy of the framework for auditor independence (Fearnley and Beattie, 2004).
To improve audit quality and ensure auditor independence and objectivity, there are
now more regulators, such as the FRC who set up the APB in an attempt to rectify the
threats that face auditors today. The APB have been continuously updating their
auditing ethical standards, since they were first introduced as guidelines for auditors in
December 2004, in an attempt to overcome the auditor independence issues that are
worldwide. The updated auditing ethical standards functions are to:
 Limit the likelihood that auditors will succumb to independence pressure
(Kershaw, 2006)
 Establish high standards of auditing
 Meet the developing needs of users of financial information and
 Ensure public confidence in the auditing process (APB, 2010).
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The following section provides a brief synopsis of the ethical standards that are in
place today.
2.3 Ethical standards (ES) (APB, 2010)
2.3.1 ES 1 – Integrity, objectivity and independence
This standard requires the audit engagement partner to identify and assess the
circumstances, which could adversely affect the auditors’ objectivity (threats),
including any perceived loss of independence, and to apply procedures (safeguards),
which will either:
- Eliminate the threat; or
- Reduce the threat to an acceptable level
2.3.2 ES 2 – Financial, business, employment and personal relationships
This standard provides requirements and guidance on specific circumstances arising
out of financial, business, employment and personal relationships with the audited
entity, which may create threats to the auditors’ objectivity or perceived loss of
independence.
2.3.3 ES 3 – Long association with the audit engagement
This standard provides requirements and guidance on specific circumstances arising
out of long association with the audit engagement, which may create threats to the
auditor’s objectivity or perceived loss of independence.
2.3.4 ES 4 – Fees, remuneration and evaluation policies, litigation, gifts and
hospitality
This standard provides requirements and guidance on specific circumstances arising
out of fees, economic dependence, litigation, remuneration and evaluation of partners
and staff, as well as gifts and hospitality, which may create threats to the auditor’s
objectivity or perceived loss of independence.
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2.3.5 ES 5 – Non-audit services provided to audit clients
This standard provides requirements and guidance on specific circumstances arising
from the provision of non-audit services by audit firms to entities audited by them,
which may create threats to the auditor’s objectivity or perceived loss of independence.
2.3.6 ES – Provisions Available for Small Entities
This standard provides alternative provisions for auditors of Small Entities to apply in
respect of the threats arising from economic dependence and where tax or accounting
services are provided and allows the option of taking advantage of exemptions from
certain parts of the requirements in APB’s Ethical Standards 1 to 5 for a Small Entity
audit engagement.
Much of this research has focused on Ethical Standard 3 – Long Association with the
Audit Engagement, and how this guideline could be improved so as to safeguard the
auditors even further by enhancing their independence.
2.4 ES 3 – Long Association with the audit engagement
ES 3 outlines the provision for long association with the audit engagement, which was
revised as recently as October 2009. This outlines that in the case of listed companies:
the audit engagement partner has a time limit of five years in which they can audit any
one firm. The audit committee can agree to retain their auditor for a further two year
period if they are fully satisfied that this is in the best interest of the quality of audit
received. In addition to this, the engagement quality control reviewer must not audit a
specific entity for a period longer than seven years.
For non listed companies, the standard outlines that once an audit engagement partner
has held its role for a continuous period of ten years, careful consideration should be
given as to whether a reasonable and informed third party would consider the audit
firm’s objectivity and independence to be impaired.
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The concept of mandatory audit firm rotation is that a company’s auditors should
provide services for a defined period only, after which they would be replaced by a
different firm of auditors. This brings us to the ultimate question as to whether such a
concept could enhance audit quality, and if so, at what cost? The following section
outlines potential threats that auditors may encounter.
2.4.1 Threats to independence
Although auditors are required to maintain their objectivity and independence, there
are incentives that might induce auditors to compromise their independence. These
threats can include:
- Self-Interest – this can occur as a result of the financial or other interests of a
professional accountant or of an immediate or close family member.
- Self-Review – this can occur when a previous judgement needs to be re-
evaluated by the accountant originally responsible for that judgement.
- Advocacy – this can occur when an accountant promotes a position or opinion
to the point that subsequent objectivity may be compromised.
- Familiarity – this can occur when, because of a close relationship, a
professional accountant becomes too sympathetic to the interests of others.
- Intimidation – this can occur if a professional accountant is deterred from
acting objectively by threats, actual or perceived.
It has been questioned whether the current guidelines are enough to overcome these
threats, or whether further regulatory changes, such as a system of mandatory audit
firm rotation is needed. Many interested parties have suggested this, as it would not
permit audit personnel to develop a close relationship. There has been call for further
research on this topic by both the international standard setters and academics (GAO,
2003; Nagy, 2005; Jackson et al, 2008).
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The researcher found that internationally there have been significant developments
towards enhancing an auditor’s independence through rotation requirements. Policies
from other countries are described in the next section.
2.5 Legislation from other countries
2.5.1 Europe
The European Commission issued a recommendation for auditors, which does not
require mandatory rotation of firms but does require mandatory partner rotation on
listed clients after seven years. It differs in some respects from the Irish and UK
requirements, namely:
- It allows a return after two years (not five years as with the Republic of Ireland
and the UK)
- It applies to ‘public interest clients’, not just listed clients
- In a group context, it extends to key audit partners other than the audit
engagement partner
No country within the EU, with the exception of Italy, currently has a system of
mandatory audit firm rotation (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
Wales, (ICAEW) 2002). Some examples of approaches adopted worldwide are shown
below.
2.5.2 Italy
Italy has required mandatory audit firm rotation of listed companies since 1975 in
which the audit firm may compete to provide the audit services for a company every 3
years and the same public accounting firm may serve as the auditor of record for a
maximum of 9 years. In addition, there is a minimum time lag of 3 years before the
predecessor auditor can return. The mandatory audit firm rotation requirement was
intended to safeguard the independence of public accounting firms.
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In a meeting with the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
Standing Committee, the Italian representative from Commissione Nazionale per le
Societa e la Borsa (CONSOB), the Italian securities regulator, indicated that Italy’s
experience with mandatory audit firm rotation has been a success, noting that
mandatory audit firm rotation gives the appearance of independence, which is
considered very important to maintaining investor confidence. (ICAEW, 2002; GAO,
2003; Cameran, 2005).
2.5.3 Brazil
Brazil enacted a mandatory audit firm rotation requirement in May 1999 with a 5-year
maximum term and minimum time lag of 3 years before the predecessor auditor can
return. The Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios (CVM), which is the Brazilian Securities
Commission, indicated that the primary reason mandatory audit firm rotation was
enacted was to strengthen audit supervision following accounting fraud at two banks
(Banco Economico and Banco Nacional). Brazil does not have a partner rotation
requirement, as the CVM believes that the requirement of rotating audit firms is
stronger than changing partners within firms (GAO, 2003; Comunale and Sexton,
2005).
2.5.4 Singapore
Starting in March 2002, the Monetary Authority of Singapore stipulated that banks
incorporated in Singapore should not appoint the same public accounting firm for more
than 5 consecutive financial years. While a “time out” period is not stipulated, banks
incorporated in Singapore shall not, except with the prior written approval of the
Monetary Authority of Singapore, appoint the same audit firm for more than 5
consecutive years. In addition, listed companies are required under the Listing Rules of
the Singapore Exchange to rotate audit partners-in-charge every 5 years.
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The primary reason Singapore instituted mandatory audit firm rotation for local banks
was to promote the independence and effectiveness of external audits. In addition,
mandatory audit firm rotation for local banks was cited by Singapore’s officials as a
measure to help (1) safeguard against public accounting firms having an excessive
focus on maintaining long-term commercial relationships with the banks they audit,
which could make the firms too committed to the banks, (2) maintain the
professionalism of audit firms - where, with long-term relationships, audit firms run
the risk of compromising their objectivity by identifying too closely with the banks’
practices and cultures, and (3) bring a fresh perspective to the audit process - where,
with long-term relationships, public accounting firms might become less alert to subtle
but important changes in the bank’s circumstances (GAO, 2003; Lai and Cheuk,
2005).
2.5.5 Countries where mandatory rotation has ceased
In Austria, the Commercial Law of 2004, required a mandatory audit firm rotation
every 6 years with a minimum time lag of 3 years before the previous auditor can be
reappointed. However the implementation of this rule was postponed awaiting
developments at EU level. In 2005, it was finally dropped by the company law that
changed the articles of Austrian Commercial Law on auditing.
In 1990, Spain introduced the system of mandatory audit firm rotation with a
maximum term of nine years, however, this system was abolished in 1995, four years
before the first rotation was due to take place (Cameran et al, 2005). Firm rotation in
Spain has been said to have had a negative impact on the quality of auditors’ work and
on the structure of the audit market (Arrunda and Paz-Ares, 1995; 1997; ICAEW,
2002). However, even though this has been implied, it is clearly evident that Spain
cannot be held up as a proven practical example of the failings of mandatory audit firm
rotation as they did not give this requirement sufficient time to materialise.
Based on the different policies summarised above, it is evident that all countries
reviewed express concerns surrounding the introduction of rotation rules as they found
Chapter 2 – Literature Review
16
that there is higher risk of audit failures, fraudulent financial reporting and lawsuits in
the earlier years of the engagement. Only one study conducted in Italy, concludes
definitely in favour of the rotation requirement as they support the validity of this rule
as a means of enhancing auditor independence. This is discussed further below.
2.6 Rotation as a means of enhancing independence
Defond et al (2002) and Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) argue that the audit report is
the final outcome of the audit process, and is the only external communication of what
the auditor has done and concluded during the audit. The decision on what type of
audit report to render to the client is the final cumulative audit decision, and is subject
to a considerable amount of professional judgement and negotiation with the client. As
such, it captures the possible influence that close audit-client relationships might have
on the auditors’ professional judgement and their behaviour in the negotiation.
If the auditors sacrifice some of their independence when facing the clients they have
been working with for a long time or the ex-colleagues from their former audit firms,
this will be reflected by a reduced professional scepticism or a soft behaviour in audit
conflict situation, leading to a lower tendency to issue a qualified audit opinion. In
contrast, if auditor independence remains in spite of the personal relationship between
auditors and clients, the auditor should be able to have an unbiased opinion concerning
the client’s financial statements.
This is accompanied by the view that auditors might smooth over problems due to the
financial rewards of maintaining a long-term relationship with a client. Entities could
easily threaten to find another auditor if the present auditor did not agree with
managements opinion.
The ICAEW (2002) report on mandatory rotation found that the idea of firm rotation
enhancing independence was originally put forward by a variety of individuals and
committees, including the Cadbury Committee, the Irish Review Group on Auditing
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and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). However, the
groups all subsequently concluded that the perceived benefits of rotation are
outweighed by the associated costs. The AICPA (1992) also explains that this
suggestion has been studied by a number of influential bodies in the US, including the
Public Oversight Board, Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities and the National
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, all of whom drew similar conclusions.
The following is an analysis of the numerous drawbacks which are associated with the
rotation requirement as found from the literature.
2.7 Disadvantages of audit firm rotation
An examination of the major audit failures that have occurred show that they were
caused by the auditor neglecting to apply the auditing rules and techniques that already
exist (Tackett et al, 2004). It has been argued that by simply enacting more rules and
auditing standards it seems unlikely to make any meaningful reduction in the
likelihood of audit failure (Meyer at al, 2007; Manry et al, 2008; Calderon and
Ofobike, 2008).
It is argued that a newly appointed auditor might fail because of a lack of a thorough
understanding of the client. Usually high quality auditors can profit from their learning
curve effect in the detection of a material error or breach. This idea is reflected in the
fact that there appears to be more litigation cases against auditors with a relatively
short relationship with their client (DeAngelo, 1981; O’ Keefe et al, 1994;
Vanstraelan, 2000).
GAO (2003) concluded that mandatory audit firm rotation may not be the most
efficient way to strengthen auditor independence and improve audit quality because of
the additional financial costs and the loss of institutional knowledge of the public
company’s previous auditor of record. This is consistent with many of the authors’
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conclusions that were reviewed (see Jackson et al, 2008; Porter et al, 2005; Bamber et
al, 2009; Carcello and Nagy, 2004).
A substantial body of academic literature identifies negative issues related to shorter
audit firm – client relationships. For example, many researchers used the value of
discretionary accruals as a measure; Johnston et al (2002) found that short
relationships (two to three years) are associated with lower quality financial reports.
This is also evident from Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) who found significantly
more audit reporting failures in the earlier years of audit firm – client relationship.
Also, Carcello and Nagy (2004) and Manry et al (2008) failed to find any evidence that
fraudulent financial reporting is more likely given longer audit firm tenure.
Audit firm tenure has been found to affect market perceptions of earnings quality, with
longer tenure appearing to be considered positively. Ghosh and Moon (2005) found
that audited financial statements and reported earnings are perceived as more reliable
for audit clients with longer audit firm tenure.
Although, there are many flaws associated with the rotation requirement, it is also
evident that there are also many strong contrary arguments, which are analysed in the
next section.
2.8 Advantages of introducing audit firm rotation
Under the current standards, accounting firms auditing publicly traded companies
require peer reviews of their work. However, judging by the many recent audit
failures, these peer reviews do not appear to be effective at preventing audit failures.
The problem with the current peer review process is that it is conducted by people
working in the same firm and they may give favourable reviews due to the fact that
they may be well acquainted (Bazerman, 2002; Tackett et al, 2004; Comunale and
Sexton, 2005).
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According to Shockley (1982), a long auditor-client relationship can cause
complacency, lack of innovation, less rigorous audit procedures and a learned
confidence in the client may arise after long association. DeAngelo (1981) assumed
that auditors have economic incentives not to disclose material errors or breaches in
view of retaining their client. This practice results from the need of the auditor to
protect his investment in client-specific expertise that is gradually built up during the
years of co-operation. In a similar way, it was suggested that long auditor tenure is not
desirable because it gives `the audit firm time to develop a close relationship with the
auditee’ (Whittington et al, 1995; pg. 177). Thus, the auditor’s incentive to preserve
independence declines over time.
The quality and competence of auditors work can decline over time as auditors become
over-familiar with their audit clients and, as a consequence, begin to lose their
professional scepticism and make unjustified assumptions. Arel et al (2005) explain
this situation and the benefit of audit firm rotation in the following terms:
“Repeat audit engagements allow auditors to rely on judgements of previous
auditors in deciding whether a management estimate is in accordance with GAAP.
Mandatory audit firm rotation will periodically force new auditors to view
managements representation for compliance with GAAP and may force management
to adopt more-conservative accounting practices” (pg 37).
Porter et al (2008) argues that, as a consequence of the financial rewards associated
with maintaining a long-term relationship with an audit client, auditors may be
tempted to ‘overlook’ or to ‘accommodate’ management’s viewpoint on financial
reporting issues. Similarly, Bazerman et al (2002) observes that auditors have strong
business reasons to remain favourable to the client and as a result approve their
accounts. Firm rotation would reduce this possibility as it frees up the audit firm to
challenge their client’s questionable practices.
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Mandatory audit firm rotation would also increase the public’s perceptions of auditors’
independence as it provides a distancing between audit firm and audit client personnel.
For example, due to the fact that Arthur Anderson’s staff were so long with the Enron
Corporation, many could not distinguish between Enron personnel and those of Arthur
Anderson.
Also, according to Porter et al (2008) the costs associated with mandatory rotation are
significantly less than the costs associated with audit failures.
Healey (2004), for example, notes that Morgan Stanley estimates the loss in market
capitalisation resulting from the failures of WorldCom, Tyco, Qwest, Enron and
Computer Associates alone to be about $460 billion. He compared this with his
estimate of the annual cost of rotation by the Big 4 accounting firms of, assuming
rotation occurs every five years, approximately $1.2 billion.
In summary, there are a range of strong arguments in favour of audit firm rotation and
also many reasons to suggest audit rotation does not in fact improve audit quality and
can even lead to suboptimal audit quality.
2.9 Conclusion
The study found that the introduction of mandatory rotation of audit firms is
considered as a means of adding to the independence of auditors, however, many
argued that the advantage of introducing it would not outweigh the costs associated
with switching audit firms every few years. In spite of this, there are increasing calls
for audit committees to consider voluntary firm rotation as a means of enhancing audit
quality (Carcello and Nagy, 2004).
Despite the GAO study in 2003 concluding that the benefits of introducing this as a
requirement would not be the most efficient way to strengthen auditor independence,
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they still requested that further studies be taken in this area to determine whether
mandatory audit firm rotation could potentially add value for enhancing auditor
independence and audit quality.
In light of the current financial crisis the global economy is facing and how the role of
the auditor may be affected from this downturn, there have been some media calls for
mandating audit firm rotation in an effort to ‘prevent the chance of any relationship
developing between client and auditor which could colour judgement and
independence’ (The Irish Times, 2010).
In conclusion, a case for and against the rotation of audit firms has been presented. The
literature revealed both positive and negative arguments for mandating audit firm
rotation. This research determines which of these viewpoints are supported most in
Ireland by seeking answers to the objectives outlined above in section 1.2. The
findings are discussed in chapter four.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the methodology that was applied in conducting this research.
Firstly, a definition of the research methodology is presented after which the aims of
the research are specified in addition to the objectives which needed to be
accomplished to achieve those aims, along with details of the research design,
philosophies and approaches employed and participants involved in the research. Also
included is a discussion on the processes employed for collecting and analysing the
data and an outline of the rationale for using the chosen research design tools. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the study’s qualities and limitations, a chapter
summary and a preview of the remaining chapters.
3.2 Definition of research methodology
Saunders et al (2009) describes "research methodology" as the theory of how research
should be undertaken, including the theoretical and philosophical assumptions upon
which research is based and the implication of these for the method or methods
adopted.
Remenyi et al (1998) refers to research methodology as “the procedural framework
within which the research is conducted. It describes an approach to a problem that can
be put into practice in a research programme” (pg. 28).
3.3 Research Design
Hair et al (2007) states that research design “provides the basic directions or “recipe”
for carrying out a project” (pg. 151). It has been described as the master plan, which
specifies the main methods and procedures to be used in the collection and analysis of
the required information. This is a view supported by the work of Kallet (2004) who
believes that the aims of the research section “should describe what was done to
answer the research question, describe how it was done, justify the experimental
design, and explain how the results were analysed” (pg. 1229).
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The research design section is subdivided into five main categories; firstly the research
approach, then the research philosophy, followed by the research focus; fourthly the
research tools and lastly the instruments to be used for the data collection process.
These categories are described in more detail within the following subsections.
3.3.1 Research Approach
Research approaches involve the use of theory and, according to Saunders et al (2009),
there are two main research approaches involving the utilisation of theory. The form of
research can vary substantially between the deductive approach and the inductive
approach. The deductive approach is when a conceptual and theoretical structure is
developed and tested by theoretical observation; therefore involves the development of
a theory that is subjected to a rigorous test (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). The inductive
approach concentrates on the development, building and understanding of a theory
from a new or unknown phenomenon. It involves the collection of data and the
examination of that data to develop theories that will subsequently relate to the
literature (Saunders et al, 2009), for example, establishing the arguments for and
against audit firm rotation or the possible recommendations for enhancing an auditor’s
independence.
For the research presented in this thesis the inductive approach was considered to be
the most suitable, mainly because the research strategy was developed to seek the
opinions of parties concerned or associated with enhancing the independence of
auditors rather than on scientific fact, an underlying assumption of the deductive
approach and therefore not compatible with the objectives of this research.
3.3.2 Research Philosophy
The two most common categories to consider when identifying the most suitable
research philosophy include positivism and interpretivism. These philosophies provide
contrasting views regarding the development of knowledge and the acceptability of the
knowledge being developed (Collis and Hussey, 2003). The adoption of one
philosophy over the other is important as it underpins the research strategy and the
methods chosen as part of that strategy in order to gather the required data.
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3.3.2.1 Positivism research
Positivism is a structured approach to data gathering and tends to be analysed and
interpreted in both a factual and statistical manner. A key distinction of positivism is
that the researcher should remain independent of the survey sample chosen, a view
supported by Saunders et al (2009), who characterises the positivist researcher as one
who adopts an approach enabling them to collect and analyse data independently and
objectively.
According to the work of Jankowicz (2000), positivism is based on the theory that
there is only one truth and that there is no alternative to this truth. It implies that the
researcher is ‘‘working with an observable social reality and that the end product of
such research can be the derivation of laws or law-like generalizations similar to those
produced by the physical and natural scientists’’ (Remenyi et al., 2003, p.32).
3.3.2.2 Interpretive Research
Interpretive research is a flexible approach to data gathering, which focuses on the
meanings and patterns behind the research, rather than measuring just the facts
associated with the research. Interpretive research, in contrast to positivism research, is
based on the theory that there can be more than one truth on a particular subject matter
(Remenyi et al, 1998).
According to Walliman (2001) interpretive research seeks to understand the subjective
reality of those being studied, making sense of their motives, actions and intentions in
a way that is meaningful to the research participants. This is also referred to by
Saunders et al (2009, pg 107) who highlights that it involves the individuals having to
enter the “social world of our research and understand their world from their point of
view”. Collis and Hussey (2003) also state that this approach is concerned with
generating theories to produce qualitative data using smaller samples.
3.3.2.3 Research Philosophy Adopted
An interpretive philosophy was considered to be the most appropriate for this study,
given the benefits that it can provide in terms of enhancing our understanding of the
probable effects of introducing mandatory audit firm rotation in Ireland. For example,
a particular aim of this study was to gain an understanding of opinions which can not
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necessarily be derived based on the measurement of facts, which is the core ethos of
the positivism philosophy. The advantage of using the interpretive philosophy is that it
provides the potential of gaining a greater understanding of the data collected, the pros
and cons of the collection methods as well as enabling the researcher to be more aware
of changes that occurred during the research process.
3.3.3 Research Focus
According to Kumar (1999), research can be carried out using three main
classifications including exploratory, descriptive and explanatory research. The
classification chosen depends on the nature of the information, which was collected in
order to answer the research question. Multiple methods may be used depending on the
areas of research on which the researcher intends to focus their attention.
3.3.3.1 Exploratory Research
The main objectives of exploratory research are to gain background information, to
define terms, to clarify problems, to establish research priorities and finally to develop
questions to be answered Hair et al, 2007). Robson (2002, pg. 59) commented on how
exploratory research is a valuable means of finding out “what is happening: to seek
new insights; to ask questions and to assess phenomena in a new light”. This is
appropriate to use where little information is known about a topic.
3.3.3.2 Descriptive Research
The purpose of descriptive research is to address the "what, when, who, where, why
and how" questions of the research and therefore data collection is often carried out
using interviews or questionnaires (Saunders et al, 2009). This approach was supported
by Kumar (1999), who describes the research as a systematic attempt to describe a
problem, situation, phenomenon, service or attitude towards an issue.
3.3.3.3 Explanatory Research
Explanatory Research, as defined by Saunders et al (2009, pg. 598), is “research that
focuses on studying a situation or a problem in order to explain the relationships
between variables”. This is also cited by Kumar (1999), who suggests that explanatory
research attempts to clarify how and why there is a relationship between two aspects of
a situation or phenomenon.
Chapter 3 – Research Methodology
26
3.3.3.4 Research Focus Adopted
The research focus of this project is mainly exploratory and to some extent descriptive.
The descriptive element mainly came from the literature that was reviewed when
attempting to answer objectives one and two in section 1.2. However, primarily the
aim of this research was to gain an insight into the opinions of the parties concerned
with the auditing profession and what they deemed as important in terms of developing
and enhancing the independence of auditors.
3.3.4 Research Tools
The research tools section deals with the nature of the data required, explaining the
main data collection methods available and highlighting the methods, which are to be
used for this particular study.
3.3.4.1 Data Required
The research procedure of any study can involve a quantitative or qualitative approach
to data acquisition and analysis, although the data required will dictate the research
tool adopted. “Both research methods have their own individual strengths and
weaknesses. These need to be recognised so that the most suitable method can be
applied to a research project” (O’ Neill, 2006, pg. 84).
The information required in this study was qualitative research as this approach is
based on meanings expressed through words and collection methods including tools
such as interviews, focus groups, surveys, case studies etc. (Dey, 1993). This method
is subjective as it involves the individual’s interpretation of events rather than focusing
on facts and evidence.
3.4 Population
It was decided that the most appropriate target group for this study were the parties
that are most concerned with auditors’ independence. The objective was to ascertain
the views of the various officers involved – namely the three out of the four
professional accounting bodies. It was also considered appropriate to interview two
officers from regulatory bodies, who would have authorisation over the accounting
profession, however, in both cases these interviewees explicitly stated that it was their
personal views on the topic rather than that of their organisation.
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Accounting firms that would be most affected by the introduction of audit firm rotation
were also considered to be an important group who would have an opinion on this
area; therefore it was decided to seek the views of these parties. Accounting firms,
especially the most successful, were considered to have the most insight and opinions
on the effects of audit firm rotation, therefore, the top 20 accounting firms in Ireland
were also included in the study.
3.5 Data Collection Methods
Research data can be acquired through both primary and secondary sources. The most
appropriate method to adopt depends on the type and purpose of the research.
3.5.1 Secondary Data
Secondary data is information that has been previously collected on a topic, and can
include both quantitative and qualitative data (Saunders et al, 2009). Kumar (1999)
comments on how the value of secondary data will vary depending on the availability,
format and quality of the data.
Many peer reviewed literature articles with relevance to this study were identified,
although, evidence of bias was discovered in certain aspects of the literature; this was
overcome by including contrary facts and opinions. To the best of the author’s
knowledge, no previous peer reviewed studies on the requirement of audit firm
rotation in Ireland are available. The intention was to address this shortcoming by
collecting the relevant data through primary data sources instead, which included
interviews, questionnaires and relevant newspaper articles which commented on audit
firm rotation.
3.5.2 Primary Data
Primary data can be collected using several methods such as interviews,
questionnaires, case study analysis, action research analysis and focus groups (Patton,
2002). Kumar (1999) argues that the method chosen will depend on factors such as the
purpose of the study, the resources available, and the skills of the researcher. Each
method has its own specific benefits and limitations and thus selection of the most
appropriate methods to answer the research question had to be undertaken, while also
considering the constraints of the other available methods.
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3.5.2.1 Case Study Analysis
Robson (2002, pg. 370) defines case study analysis as “a strategy for doing research
which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon
within its real life context using sources of evidence”. The aim is to provide an
analysis of the context and processes, which illuminate the theoretical issues being
studied (Cassell and Symon, 2004). As this study was mainly done through exploratory
research and as a significant amount of primary research was required from multiple
stakeholders, it was decided that a case study analysis on a single organisation would
not provide adequate and accurate information.
3.5.2.2 Action Research
Action research is “research in which the researchers work explicitly with and for
people rather than undertake research on them” (Meyer, 2000; pg. 179). It is often a
collaborative activity among colleagues searching for solutions to everyday problems.
This was deemed as an inappropriate method of data collection for this project as it
was intended to ascertain the views of certain stakeholders on how to enhance an
auditor’s independence and this would have been impossible using this method.
3.5.2.3 Focus Groups
The focus group method of data collection is a technique of group interviews that
generates data through the opinions expressed by participants individually and
collectively (Kitzinger, 1995). Whilst focus groups are a very effective method of
collecting data due to offering the potential to record immediate and spontaneous
responses from the group, there can be bias, as opinions of one member of the group
may influence the opinions of others. Therefore, this method was disregarded and it
was decided that the most appropriate methods to collect the data required were
interviews and questionnaires.
3.5.2.4 Interviews
An interview can be described as a market research tool used to gather valid and
reliable data during a purposeful discussion between two or more people (Kahn and
Cannell, 1957). According to Walliman (2001), interviews are particularly suitable for
gathering qualitative data, but may also be used in circumstances where quantitative
data is required. There are three main types of interviews, which can take place –
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structured, unstructured and semi-structured interviews.
3.5.2.4.1 Structured Interviews
Structured interviews are questionnaires based on a predetermined and standardised or
identical set of questions. The interviewer reads out each question and then records the
response on a standardised schedule, usually with pre-coded answers (Saunders et al,
2009).
3.5.2.4.2 Unstructured Interviews
Unstructured interviews go further in the extent to which emphasis is placed on the
interviewee’s thoughts. The researcher’s role is to be as unintrusive as possible; to start
the ball rolling by introducing a theme or topic and then letting the interviewee
develop his or her ideas and pursue his or her train of thought (Denscombe, 2005).
3.5.2.4.3 Semi-Structured
In semi-structured interviews, the researcher will have a list of themes and questions to
be covered. This format of interview allows questions to be asked in no particular
order. Additional questions may also be asked, as the interviewer sees fit, to examine
associated issues that arise in the course of the interview (Smith, 2003).
3.5.2.5 Questionnaires
Questionnaires are a useful way of collecting primary data that is descriptive in nature.
These can be used to measure the behaviour, attitude, awareness and characteristics
from a large sample. Using a questionnaire allows the surveyor to standardise the
wording and sequence of the questions, which will then allow the data to be recorded
quickly and accurately (Saunders et al, 2009).
3.5.3 Research Tools Adopted and Justification
After reviewing the various research tools available, the researcher decided that a
combination of interviews and questionnaires were most appropriate to address the
research aims and objectives outlined in section 1.2. As outlined in the previous
subsections, there are many different types of data collection tools available however,
based on the aims and objectives of the research and the requirements that these entail
only a subset of methods were deemed appropriate as the others did not meet the
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required in-depth analysis necessary for the chosen sample.
Interviews were identified as an appropriate method of data collection for this study,
given the research objectives and nature of the information required, i.e. qualitative
opinions. It was decided to perform a series of semi-structured interviews on the
auditing regulators and three out of the four Irish accounting professional bodies.
Interviews can provide very valuable information and were thus considered very
suitable for this study however conducting interviews can be a time consuming data
collection exercise, requiring lot of effort if a large sample size is required therefore; it
was decided that the use of questionnaires would also be useful to gain an additional
insight on the opinions and perspectives of audit firm rotation. A questionnaire (see
appendix 1) was sent to the audit ethics partners of the Top 20 accounting firms in
Ireland, enabling the collection of a representative analysis of the parties that audit
firm rotation would impact on if mandated in Ireland.
Four of the interviews were conducted over the telephone to accommodate the busy
schedule of the interviewees. The remaining two interviews were conducted via email.
The questions for both the interviews and questionnaires were developed based on the
review of the literature presented in chapter two and also adjusted from the study
conducted on behalf of the SOX Act in the U.S. on mandatory audit firm rotation.
Prior to conducting the interviews and administering the questionnaires, the questions
were firstly appraised by the researcher’s supervisor and by the course director who
has a small accounting practice that carries out audits. An advantage of this pilot test is
that any issues or problems with formatting, comprehensibility or structure can be
identified before delivering the questionnaire and subsequently questions can be
deleted or revised.
The questions were also refined further after the first interview was conducted (based
on valuable feedback provided by the interviewee) which resulted in some of the
questions being changed or omitted and new questions added. It is very important to
ensure that the interview questions are of a quality that maintains the interviewees’
interest and that the format is such that the interviewees do not get confused about the
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purpose of the research. The interview questions (presented in appendix 2) have been
developed to ensure the quality that is needed meets these objectives.
3.6 Data Analysis
The data was stored on the online survey tool surveymonkey.com and analysed using
Microsoft Excel®, with the responses being transformed into meaningful categories
(Parasuraman et al, 2004). As most of the questions are closed in the questionnaire,
they were already categorised. In total, there were seven survey questionnaires
returned, which in total represents a response rate of thirty-five percent. This was
deemed an acceptable amount due to the fact that it has been said that response rates of
between fifteen and twenty-three percent may be adequate to make scientifically sound
judgements (Berger et al, 2005; Dilliman, 2000; cited by Kramer et al, 2008). The
responses to the open questions employed in the semi-structured interviews were
categorised around the research objectives described in section 1.2.
3.7 Ethical Considerations
Good ethical practice requires that all research is conducted on the basis of respect for
and adherence to regulatory guidelines and internationally accepted ethical norms
focusing on the welfare of the study participants (LYIT ethics form, 2010). The
research undertaken was approved and governed by the LYIT School Research Ethics
Committee.
3.8 Conclusion
This research was carried out in an attempt to ascertain whether mandatory audit firm
rotation should be introduced in Ireland. The research took the form of interpretive
research using the inductive approach. It was descriptive to an extent but mainly
exploratory and the data collected was qualitative in nature. The research process
consisted of the circulation of 20 questionnaires to the ‘Top 20’ accounting firms along
with interviews with the professional bodies and the audit regulators. This chapter has
outlined the reasons for the approach taken, based on research into best practise. The
findings from the research are discussed in chapter four.
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Chapter 4
Research Findings and Analysis
4.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines how the objectives outlined in section 1.2 were accomplished
based on the analyses of the results produced by the research methods adopted for this
study. The analysis involved an examination of the survey responses and a review of
the transcripts from the interviews carried out in order to ascertain the views on the
research topic. The implications of these results are discussed in chapter five along
with the conclusions drawn from them.
4.2 Analysis of survey results and interview findings
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives from three of the
professional accounting bodies and two regulatory bodies as outlined in section 3.6.
The purpose of these interviews was to ascertain opinions on the concept of
introducing audit firm rotation in Ireland as a method of enhancing an auditor’s
independence. Out of six interview requests, five responded. The interviewees were
assured that they would remain anonymous; therefore, they will be referred to as
interviewee one, two, three, four and five. A list of the questions that were used as a
guideline is included in appendix 2.
The questionnaires were sent to the top 20 accounting firms of which a thirty-five
percent response rate was achieved. The main findings are discussed below and a copy
of the questionnaire can be found in appendix 1.
4.2.1 Study demographics
From the responses of the questionnaire, the majority of respondents were members of
the Institute of Chartered Accountants (85.7%) with the remainder being associates of
the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants. These ratios were expected due to
the fact that 50 per cent of the firms from the questionnaire population are members of
Chartered Accountants (ICAI webpage; 2010).
Each subsection below is based around a question that was posed in the survey and in
which the results and a discussion of results are provided.
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4.2.2 Important factors affecting an auditor’s ability to detect financial reporting
issues
Figure 4.1
100.0%
28.6%
28.6%
42.9%
28.6%
85.7%
42.9%
Appropriate staff education, training and
experience
Appropriate knowledge of Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP)
Appropriate knowledge if International
Auditing Standards (IAS)
Appropriate audit team staffing level
Appropriate firm experience within the
company's industry
Appropriate risk assessment process for the
client acceptance process
Appropriate knowledge of the client's
operations, systems and financial reporting
practices
Source: Analysis of Survey Data
As shown in Figure 4.1, 100% of respondents regarded appropriate staff education,
training and experience as being of very great importance with regard to the auditors
ability to detect financial reporting issues, however, only 28.6% rated Appropriate
Knowledge of International Auditing Standards, Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles and appropriate firm experience within the client’s industry as being of
high importance.
This differs from what was found with the interview responses, as many of them
commented on the importance of experience and knowledge of a company’s industry
and how this is a requirement under ISA 315, Understanding the Entity and It’s
Environment and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement, which states that
“obtaining an understanding of the entity and its environment is an essential aspect of
performing an audit” (Standards and Guidance, 2009; pg. 400).
In many of the publications reviewed, the aspect of knowing your clients’ industry and
background was also referred to as a drawback of audit rotation as this is a “hidden
cost” in the first years of an audit. One interviewee stated that the main reason that
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auditors would find mandatory rotation “irritating to the auditing profession is because
it probably requires about three times the cost and the time in the first year of an audit
to achieve the knowledge required; and then the contract would be lost to another
tendering firm a few years later” therefore potentially not being very cost effective to
the auditing firm and/or company.
Furthermore, all respondents to the survey said that, during the first year of an auditors
term, there tends to be less client-specific knowledge than in the later years of tenure,
however, two of the interviewees claimed that, if an auditor is complying with the
standards there should be no lack of knowledge in any area of the clients specific
operations whether it is years one or ten.
4.2.3 Affects of continuous pressure on accounting firms to retain clients
Figure 4.2
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As shown in the above figure, the majority of respondents claimed that there was little
pressure on the engagement partner(s) to retain clients by a means of not dealing with
any financial reporting issues appropriately. This coincides with the response of
interviewee one who stated that “for any accountant not to deal with any financial
reporting issue appropriately carries severe consequences in terms of regulatory action
and reputational risk”.
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However, one interviewee claimed that “if a firm had a client paying fees of
approximately ten thousand euro and the managers of the company wanted the auditor
to delete a few sentences from their audit report, they may not want to go against them
in case they would lose them so you might just do what they say in order to retain
them".
Similarly, another interviewee said that "there is major pressure on accounting firms to
retain their clients, claiming that “in the current market of over-supply and under-
demand – there are far too many accountants....therefore, every client you have is
precious and you don’t want to lose any of them so to retain the fee you will maximise
you effort so as not to issue an adverse audit opinion”.
4.2.4 Rotation as a means of enhancing independence
The research has shown that there can be a higher risk of being able to uncover any
issues in the earlier years of an auditor’s tenure, as the new firm may not have fully
developed and applied an in-depth understanding of the firm’s financial reporting
practices. Both arguments for and against this way of thinking were expressed from the
interviewees.
One interviewee conveyed that, in most cases, “auditors are probably more likely to
find ‘the bad stuff’ at the beginning of their tenure as they are supposed to be looking
at everything”. In contrast to this, another interviewee stated that “there is always a
possibility of missing something in the first year as you may not know enough about
the entity, but of course, it is common knowledge that it is virtually impossible for an
auditor to check everything, so they should be able to find out the same things in year
one as you would in year ten”.
From analysis of the questionnaire, 57.1% of respondents claimed that there is a
significant likelihood that a new auditor will have initially less specific knowledge of
the clients operation than the previous auditor, with the same number claiming that
there is only a slight possibility that a new audit firm would not detect material
misstatements in the financial statements in the first year of tenure.
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4.2.5 Issues with familiarity
As stated in the literature review, the quality and competence of an auditors work tends
to decline over time as auditors become over-familiar with their audit clients and, as a
consequence, begin to lose their professional scepticism and make unjustified
assumptions (Arel et al, 2005). Conversely, from the survey responses, 57.1%
generally disagreed that the risk of an audit failure is likely to increase as the audit
tenure period increases due to the “comfort level” that accumulates with the audit
firm’s long-term relationship with client-management.
An interviewee stated that “even though the long established auditor can become too
comfortable and the familiarity threat can arise with the long established auditor, you
must see the upside in this. For example, if the small accountant firm in Letterkenny
has been auditing the same pub for the past ten years, they will be the firm to notice if
something is different or something doesn’t change when it is supposed to change –
these will be the people that will know the business inside out!”
Currently, Ethical Standard 3, as described in section 2.4 is the guideline that has been
prescribed as the “way to overcome” the familiarity threat and this was agreed with by
interviewee four who stated “the safeguards to the familiarity threat should be
implemented in full and therefore this issue will not arise”. This was also agreed with,
to a certain level, by interviewee three who had the opinion that the risk of familiarity
can be “mitigated to some extent by partner rotation within a firm......[However] a
complete fresh perspective of an audit periodically, by a new audit firm, may lend a
hand to uncovering risks that may have not been spotted by the previous auditors as
they may tend to focus on the ‘known’ risks”.
Interviewee five believes that the feared comfort level “nearly always arises” after a
long term relationship with a client’s management. “You can see a lot of things going
wrong when a comfort level exists. Every audit should be gone into with a professional
scepticism – but as we all know, this is not always the case. You just cannot help but
have the human intervention......You can become too trusting and complacent”.
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4.2.6 Views on implementing audit firm rotation
4.2.6.1 Suggested limit on an auditor’s tenure
Figure 4.3
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In Figure 4.3 it can be seen that there were mixed views on the aspect of limiting the
audit firms audit tenure period. An interviewee claimed that the tenure should “be no
more than three years” and when asked whether he felt if this may be too short of a
time, he claimed “that any longer than three years and the comfort level kicks in, this is
when you begin to get to know the client a bit better and next thing you know you’ll
have something like an Arthur Andersen case to deal with”.
This corresponds with what was found in the literature as “due to its [Arthur
Andersen’s] long association with the company [Enron], Andersen’s auditors failed to
uncover the wrongdoing that went on at Enron as soon as it occurred” (Tackett et al,
2004; Toffler, 2005). Enron went down because of their many “off-shore accounts”
which were unidentified by Andersen at that time. It was also noted by numerous
authors that due to the fact that Arthur Andersen’s staff were so long with the Enron
Corporation, many people could not distinguish between Enron personnel and those of
Arthur Andersen (Matinis et al, 2009; Porter et al, 2008; Healey, 2004).
Chapter 4 – Research Findings and Analysis
38
Another interviewee was of the opinion that, if firm rotation was mandated in Ireland,
“it would probably make more sense to keep it aligned with the existing standard for
engagement partners who must rotate every five to seven years”. A similar argument
was also made by another interviewee who stated that “every seven years would
probably make most sense as per ethical standard 3 for engagement partners.” This
coincides with what was found from the survey analysis, where 57.1% of respondents
stated that between five and seven years should be the limit on every auditing entity.
This was also found in the same survey that was carried out in the U.S. (GAO, 2003).
However, another interviewee stated, “this is a question that can only be answered
after in depth consultation with the profession, regulators and audit clients” suggesting
seven is not the "magic number" that everyone would agree on.
The general feeling amongst all interviewees was that there would need to be a
“cooling off period” before the audit firm should be allowed to return to the client after
rotating off. One interviewee stated that “twelve months would be a sufficient time-out
for any auditor to be away from a client”. The other interviewees along with the
majority of the respondents suggested that there should be at least two or three years
before they should come back to the same client so that they “have adequate time to
de-familiarise themselves before they go back to the same client again”.
4.2.6.2 How mandatory firm rotation should be introduced
If mandatory audit firm rotation were required, a number of implementing factors
affecting the structure of the requirement would need to be decided by policy makers,
however, some opinions from the interviewees and survey respondents are included
below.
Many comments were received regarding how the implementation should occur if it
was required in Ireland, most of which corresponded with the findings of the same
survey that was carried out in the U.S. (GAO, 2003). For example, when asked the
question regarding whether the requirement should be introduced over a number of
years, a staggered introduction or brought in immediately, the general response was to
implement it “straight away...there is no point in dragging standards out”. However,
interviewee four suggested, “there should be a blanket time so as to avoid a significant
number of companies changing auditors simultaneously”.
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Two of the interviewees believed that firm rotation, if it was introduced, should not be
applied uniformly to all firms regardless of nature and size. One respondent mentioned
that “this requirement would probably be most suited to public interest entities” with
another implying that it may be suited to “auditors with smaller clients , paying less
fees, as they might not miss their clients as much as the larger firms”.
4.2.6.3 Advantages of audit firm rotation
4.2.6.3.1 Independence
Corresponding with the literature provided, many interviewees agreed that mandating
audit firm rotation would enhance independence; nevertheless, the question “at what
cost?” arose after that. One interviewee stated that “it would probably be great for the
independence issue but I don’t think anyone has ever failed solely because of their
independence”.
Another interviewee claimed that audit firm rotation would “ensure that sufficient
space is created between an auditor and their client. It will guarantee a fresh
perspective on audit issues after the changeover”. Interviewee three stated that “the
whole concept of rotating the firms around would have to naturally improve
independence and the standards that are associated with it”.
4.2.6.3.2 Increased competition
Many interviewees discussed how the competition would more than likely increase for
the smaller firms, as “there would be tenders put out every few years and everyone
would have as much of a chance as the next to get the clients”. In contrast to this, one
interviewee claimed that “as the number of larger firms is limited and the smaller firms
would not always have the capacity to take on the larger audits, this may leave a void
in the market”.
This fact was also referred to other interviewees who both discussed the fact that only
two of the accounting firms in Ireland can audit the bigger banks. This is because of
resource issues and also the fact that they may need to have branches in other countries
and this would not be possible from the mid-tier or remaining two of the big four
accounting firms. “Audit firm rotation would probably only work within a limited
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number of firms, for example, it would probably only be the big four and BDO
Simpson Xavier that would have the resources to audit the listed companies so they
would have to rotate amongst each other every few years”.
4.2.6.3.3 Fresh look that a new auditor provides
Many of the interviewees commented on the advantages associated with the fresh look
that a new auditor provides. One interviewee suggested that one reason for requiring a
fresh look is “relationships become more relaxed, auditors get too comfortable and
they tend to trust more and place more reliance on management”. It was also said “that
there should be a fresh pair of eyes at the head of every audit – for a job to be done
right!”
Interviewee one commented on the fact that “a fresh perspective would be invaluable,
however, this would be an issue for the company, its board and shareholders, as to
whether the additional costs incurred make it worthwhile”. However, another
interviewee stated that “all firms must be prepared to incur this additional cost in year
one if the audit is to be done right” and that “it is in the standards that you must
understand your clients entity and its environment, so this should be done regardless”.
4.2.6.3.4 Successor auditor reviewing the work of their predecessor
One distinct advantage of introducing audit firm rotation is the fact that when a new
auditor takes over the original auditor’s client, they will be reviewing the financial
statement judgements made by their predecessor. This, in turn, should reduce the
likelihood that the original auditor may be tempted to overlook any accounting
irregularities that may exist, and thus focus the auditors’ attention on not being too
complacent.
Interviewee five commented on this fact by stating that “when you know someone else
may be checking your working papers next year, you will more than likely up your
game! Pride alone will make you want to do better. The reality is that no one would
want anyone to pick fault with the work they have done so they would probably do the
work without any imperfections”.
Similarly, interviewee one expressed an opinion by stating that “an auditor will
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conduct a more thorough and cynical audit, and will be more inclined to put right any
problems encountered, if they knew that another auditor would be scrutinising their
work in the near future”.
4.2.6.3.5 Overcoming the familiarity threat
As found in the literature, if an audit firms tenure was reduced to a specific number of
years, this would give the audit firm less time to become over comfortable and too
complacent with the management of the client’s firm. As Bazerman et al (2002; pg.
99) observe, “auditors have strong business reasons to remain in their clients’ good
graces and are thus highly motivated to approve their clients’ accounts”. Audit firm
rotation would overcome this, as audit firm would not risk future loss of a client if the
queried questionable accounting practices.
Interviewee two claims that a comfort level “nearly always arises” between
management and the audit team after a long-term relationship. He also commented on
how “you can see a lot of things going wrong when a comfort level exists. Every audit
should be gone into with professional scepticism; however, this is not always the case.
You cannot help but have that human intervention when you are working alongside the
same people for a long period of time”. The interviewee agreed that audit firm rotation
would overcome this threat.
A problem that was identified based on a review of the literature (Porter et al, 2005)
suggested that when there is a long standing relationship between the audit firm and
client, as well as the auditor becoming familiar with the clients business, the client can
begin to realise how the audit firm conducts their checks, for example, the client will
know what the auditor looks at year on year and this can leave room for manipulation.
Another interviewee claimed that “along with knowing what controls the auditor will
be looking at, they will also know what materiality level is and the staff of the client
are likely to take advantage of this”. He used an example of how he had been working
with an auditor whose client’s balance sheet was around €70 billion and they rounded
their figures down to the nearest million. When he queried how this may affect the
final balance sheet, the auditor said that nearly every year the client’s books are out by
around €4 million and this would be overlooked, stating that “on the overall scale of
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things this was not a material amount”. The interviewee expressed concern
surrounding this matter, claiming that “it may not have been material in relation to the
overall scheme of things, however, staff may use this as an opportunity of
manipulation or stealing, knowing that this would be overlooked by that auditor as €4
million would be a small amount when compared to what they might be looking for”.
4.2.6.4 Disadvantages of audit firm rotation
4.2.6.4.1 Loss of client-specific knowledge
There is a substantive amount of literature regarding “the amount of time it takes an
auditor to gain a thorough knowledge of a business, its policies, operations, accounting
system, internal controls, key personnel, and so on – an essential requirement for an
effective audit in today’s environment” (Porter et al, 2003; pg. 84). An interviewee
claimed that “it is inevitable that an audit firm may need a couple of years to fully
come to terms with a new clients business, especially if it is complex and/or diverse.
Audit firm rotation may lead to a less effective audit process”.
As stated in the review of the literature, it has been argued that a newly appointed
auditor might fail because of a lack of a thorough understanding of the client. This was
observed by interviewee four, stating that “at the beginning of an audit, it takes so
much time to gather all the information needed to ensure that you can truly verify that
the accounts give a true and fair view, sometimes one might tend to rely on
management representatives for information or be tempted to cut corners and
obviously this is not good audit practice even though, every now and then, it might be
the only way to get the audit completed”.
This was also suggested by interviewee two, who claimed that “when you do all this
work to get to know your client in the first place, the last thing you want to do is to
lose all the knowledge that you accumulated over the years by rotating off the client
every few years”.
4.2.6.4.2 Cost associated with rotating audit firms
Each of the interviewees referred to the cost of rotating auditors every few years. This
coincides with the literature, where it was repeated in numerous studies of how the
cost associated with rotating audit firms would exceed the benefits that would be
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derived from it. Interviewee five stressed the fact that “in many cases the auditor is
usually prepared to make a loss in years one and two of their tenure with a client due to
all the additional work that is needed in the first few years. They do not mind making
this loss as it usually would be compensated for in the later years of their tenure. With
audit firm rotation, this cost would have to be redeemed as soon as possible therefore
increasing the cost at the beginning of the audit”.
Interviewee four commented on how it can be costly for the client as well as the audit
firm saying how “it takes the client a long time to get familiar with the auditor and
showing the auditor their business and operations and so on, which can be time
consuming and expensive for the client to be giving up time to do this”. Interviewee
two referred to “how irritating it could be for clients, who have answered all the
questions that their original auditor had asked them, just to answer the same ones again
with the successor auditor”.
4.2.6.4.3 Lack of resources
Two of the interviewees referred to how only two of the accounting firms in Ireland
would be able to compete for the audits in the big banks. Both of them stated that it is
mainly “down to a resources issue” and how “it would be pointless to be rotating
between two audit firms every few years”. It was also commented on how only the Big
4 and one other firm would have the resources to conduct the audit of any of the Irish
PLCs”. Due to these reasons, it was said that “maybe when the rotation period is due,
there may be a lack of companies to tender for the clients and prices may go up or the
client may have to choose a firm with a lack of expertise or resources which could
harm the company”.
4.2.6.4.4 Loss of clients
The general consensus between the interviewees was that the smaller firms would be
the most affected by audit firm rotation. Interviewee one talked about how “the smaller
firms may have one larger client that they have been working with for years and then
to have to give up this client through a mandatory rotation scheme may be detrimental
to their company’s existence”. Interviewee four stated that “as clients become familiar
with their auditor they tend to be more open about giving information to the auditor,
however, when a new auditor comes in, it may be a while before the client feels
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comfortable about giving away the required data”.
4.2.6.5 Alternatives methods for enhancing independence
4.2.6.5.1 Reducing the 10% fee threshold
Currently, ethical standard four does not allow the fees of any one client, from both
audit and non-audit services, to exceed 10%`of the annual fee income of the audit firm.
Interviewee one believes that the biggest threat to an auditor’s independence is the fees
that they receive. This interviewee commented on how he “couldn’t stress enough the
fact that reducing the 10% threshold for fees would probably be the best way to
enhance an auditor’s independence”. He referred to how he believes that “10% from
only one client seems to be far too much and the standard setters could probably
reduce this to half of that and even that might not be enough”.
4.2.6.5.2 Regulatory monitoring by a government body
Another suggestion was to introduce a “direct regulatory monitoring system by a
government body who would review each auditors work year after year to ensure they
are fulfilling their duties to a certain standard. A government approved body would
make investors happier knowing that the auditor themselves do not choose who
reviews their work”. This was also referred to by interviewee two who said that “even
if they had a better monitoring and enforcement system for the existing standards there
may not be as many audit failures occurring”.
4.2.6.5.3 Appointment of auditors by the state
A proposal of appointing auditors by the state was also suggested as a means of
enhancing independence. Interviewee four referred to how “an auditor may be under
pressure from their client when the client holds full responsibility on whether the
auditor should be reappointed or not”. If the client had no say in the matter, the auditor
may not feel under obligation to agree with the client in conflicting matters.
4.2.6.5.4 Independent oversight body
Having an independent oversight body was suggested by two of the interviewees and
was also found in the review of the literature. Interviewee five claimed that “if you had
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someone else continuously checking your work you would ensure that everything you
did was to the best quality”. She also mentioned how “in nearly every profession there
is a snobbery factor and people take pride in the work they do, therefore auditors may
go that extra mile if they knew there would be a hot review involved”. Similarly,
interviewee two stated that “if there were surprise visits every so often by an
independent party to check the papers of an auditor, there would most likely be no
deficiencies in the work they have done”.
4.2.6.5.5 Rotation of audit team
Another proposal of rotating the audit team rather than only the engagement partner
might make the auditors work more independent. Interviewee one claimed that “it
doesn’t make a big difference in rotating the engagement partner every few years from
a client. It would make much more sense to rotate the whole team from clients every
few years, as these are the ones that ask all the questions and tick all the boxes so they
would probably get more acquainted with the client’s staff”.
4.3 Conclusion
This chapter analysed and discussed the findings of the semi-structured interviews and
the survey questionnaire that was carried out by the researcher. It was found that there
were mixed reviews on audit firm rotation, however, all interviewees agreed that audit
firm rotation would enhance an auditor’s independence but they also suggested
alternative methods that may not be as taxing to the audit profession. In summary, the
findings have answered the research question and met the research objectives and the
overall conclusions and recommendation of the study is outlined in chapter five.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Introduction
This chapter summarises the findings of the research, provides recommendations and
includes suggestions for further areas of research based on the findings of the
secondary and primary research conducted for the project and detailed in the previous
chapters. Conclusions help determine and examine whether the aims and objectives of
this research have been met.
A review of literature revealed a lack of information on the impact of the possibility of
introducing audit firm rotation in Ireland. A review of the literature was undertaken to
develop the research strategy and construct appropriate questions, which led to a well
defined set of research aims and objectives outlined in section 1.2.
5.2 Overview of the main findings
5.2.1 Link between auditor rotation and auditor independence
A review of the literature established that audit partner rotation was introduced initially
as a method for enhancing an auditor’s independence by overcoming the familiarity
threat. As found in many previous studies, the association between auditor tenure and
audit judgments has long remained an issue of concern for regulators and others
(Rama, 2004). The Metcalf Committee report (U. S. Senate, 1976; cited by GAO,
2003) notes that "long association between a corporation and an accounting firm may
lead to such close identification of the accounting firm with the interests of its client's
management that truly independent action by the accounting firm becomes difficult."
All interviewees agreed with the fact that as “the length of auditor tenure increases,
there is increased likelihood of auditors going along with the wishes of the client in
accounting matters”. This is aligned with the findings presented in the GAO study in
the US. However, even though this statement may be true, there is specific guidance
on the fact that an auditor must go into every audit with professional scepticism and an
objective mind (as per the APB’s guidelines).
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It is therefore concluded that, even though there is guidance on how an audit should be
conducted with integrity and objectivity, this is not always the case. As many of the
interviewees clearly stated “it is quite impossible to be working with a client year after
year and not become over familiar and begin to make assumptions regarding the
internal controls, management reps and so on”. Due to the fact that independence may
be impaired with a long established auditor, it was felt that ethical standard three (see
section 2.4) could be improved on, by perhaps, changing partner rotation to firm
rotation.
5.2.2 Legislation from other countries regarding auditor rotation
From the analysis, it was found that Italy and Brazil has mandatory audit firm rotation
for public companies and Singapore introduced the requirement for banks that are
incorporated in Singapore. Spain reported that they previously had mandatory audit
firm rotation required; however, from reviews of the literature from Spain (see Ruiz-
Barbadillo et al, 2009) the time given to actually enabled audit firm rotation to have a
measureable impact was not sufficient. They got rid of the rule four years prior to the
first proposed audit changeover.
Generally, reasons reported for requiring mandatory audit firm rotation related to
auditor independence, audit quality, or increased competition for audit services. The
main reason described for abandoning audit firm rotation related to its lack of cost
effectiveness. This is also how the GAO concluded in their report regarding rotation of
audit firms in the U.S., stating that they found that the cost of introducing such a
requirement would not exceed the benefits that are associated with it.
5.2.3 Overall views on mandatory audit firm rotation
From the respondents to the questionnaire and interviewees, the general consensus was
that currently there are a sufficient number of standards that impose the necessity for
auditors to be independent of the client; however, one interviewee stated that “rotating
audit partners is good, but firms would probably be better”. The authors reviewed
broadly concluded that audit firm rotation would enhance independence, however, it is
more than likely that it would be extremely difficult to implement, due to the costs of
rotating an auditor every few years. A respondent from the survey stated that they “do
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not believe the fresh look benefits outweigh the loss of company-specific knowledge
and knowledge of the quality and integrity of the key financial and control personnel”.
5.2.4 Impact of introducing audit firm rotation
From the primary research, the main conclusion drawn is that audit firm rotation
should be introduced uniformly for all audits regardless of size and nature. However,
there was some disagreement with this as some respondents deemed that introduction
over a staggered basis should be applied. It was felt that this would give companies a
chance to prepare themselves with the changeover.
It is thus concluded that, as with all other standards and guidance for auditors, there
should be a time and date set for audit firm rotation and a clear set of guidelines on
how this can be achieved efficiently and within the time frame allowable. Auditors
should have sufficient time to come to terms with the proposed requirement, as this is
usually how the standards are introduced.
5.2.5 Arguments for and against audit firm rotation
The general arguments for and against mandatory audit firm rotation are concerned
with auditor independence, audit quality and increased audit cost which conforms with
the review of the literature outlined in sections 2.7 and 2.8.
Those who supported mandatory audit firm rotation contended that pressures faced by
auditors to retain their clients, especially in today’s environment, coupled with the
auditors comfort level with management developed over time, can adversely affect the
auditors actions to appropriately deal with financial reporting issues that materially
affect the company’s financial statements.
Those who were against audit firm rotation argued that the new auditors lack of
knowledge of the company’s operations and industry-specific knowledge and the time
needed to acquire that knowledge, increases the risk of an auditor not detecting
financial reporting issues that could materially affect the company’s financial
statements in the initial years of the new auditors tenure.
In addition, those who oppose mandatory audit firm rotation believe that it will
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increase costs incurred by both the accounting firms and their clients. It was believed
that the increased risk of an audit failure and the added costs of audit firm rotation
outweighs the value of a periodic “fresh look” by a new auditor. In contrast, those who
support audit firm rotation believe the value of the “fresh look” to protect the
stakeholders who rely on the financial statements outweighs the added costs associated
with mandatory audit firm rotation.
Many inconsistencies were found among the literature reviewed; many authors
included advantages that other authors considered as shortcomings. This was also the
observed from the analysis of the responses from the interviewees. For example, many
stated that a fresh pair of eyes is good in any situation, whereas, others believed that a
fresh pair of eyes are at a distinct disadvantage as they would be lacking in client-
specific knowledge and are unable to avail of the learning curve.
Another example of these inconsistencies is the fact that many authors believed that
the cost associated with audit firm rotation would not exceed the benefits of the
requirement, while one author stated that Morgan Stanley estimates the loss in market
capitalisation resulting from the failures of WorldCom, Tyco, Qwest, Enron and
Computer Associates alone to be about $460 billion. He compared this with his
estimate of the annual cost of rotation by the Big 4 accounting firms of, assuming
rotation occurs every five years, approximately $1.2 billion.
In summary, there are a range of strong arguments in favour of audit firm rotation and
also many reasons to suggest audit rotation does not in fact improve audit quality.
There are a range of conflicting views which make it difficult to specifically
recommend a particular strategy to ensure auditors independence however a range of
recommendations are outlined below.
5.2.6 Alternatives for enhancing an auditor’s independence
There were many suggestions for enhancing an auditor’s independence as outlined in
section 4.2.6.5. The researcher feels that reducing the 10% fee threshold from audit
and non-audit services would be an excellent way to improve the perceptions of an
auditor’s independence as, at the end of the day, the auditor may rely on the fees of a
particular client and may do anything in order to retain that client but there is clear
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evidence to suggest this may lead to complete audit failure. If the fee threshold was
reduced to, for example, 5%, the auditor may not be so inclined to become attached to
any particular client.
There is also the possible introduction of independent third party reviews, which
would be a good way to improve the quality of an auditors work along with the fact
that they may be forced to act more sceptical towards the client in an attempt to
uncover any issues before the third party can detect anything. In agreement with
interviewee five, the researcher believes that there is always “a snobbery factor and
people take pride in the work they do; therefore auditors may go that extra mile if they
knew there would be a hot review involved”.
5.3 Overall conclusion
This research aimed to ascertain whether mandatory audit firm rotation should be
introduced in Ireland and to determine whether this requirement could potentially add
value to an auditor’s independence. The research process consisted of reviewing the
vast range of literature available, the circulation of 20 questionnaires to the ‘Top 20’
accounting firms along with interviews with professional bodies and the audit
regulators.
The research topic was deemed to be of significant importance given that studies in
other jurisdictions found that the introduction of mandatory rotation of audit firms is
considered an appropriate means of adding to the independence of auditors, however,
many argued that the advantage of introducing it would not outweigh the costs
associated with switching audit firms every few years. It was found that there are
increasing calls for audit committees to consider voluntary firm rotation as a means of
enhancing audit quality, emphasising the need for more research in the area, hence this
study. Research of the literature was undertaken to reveal both the positive and
negative arguments for mandating audit firm rotation. This research has determined
which of these viewpoints is supported most in Ireland.
The findings of the research concluded that, in Ireland, even though audit firm rotation
would enhance an auditor’s independence, this requirement would be time consuming
and costly for both the auditor and client. The time consumption would be a result of
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the audit firm starting from scratch with each new audit client to acquire the client-
specific knowledge required to conduct the audit and this would create a large initial
cost in the first years of an auditor’s tenure.
Although the research evidence would suggest that this requirement should not be
introduced due to the aforementioned consequences, this could still be considered a
viable option to increase the regulation on the auditing profession to prevent serious
issues in the future. Just because a solution to a problem is complex or is costly to
implement, it does not mean it is not a feasible solution.
For example, the most recent corporate scandal where “Lehman attempted to conceal
its losses with the help of Ernst & Young” (Kim, 2010), may have been avoided if
Ernst & Young had not been with the Lehman Brothers since 1994. Ernst and Young
were also brought to light in 2004 because of their independence by American
Express. One report commented that “after a string of issues with independence that
threatened their credibility and ability to accept new audit work, American Express
unceremoniously dumped them and hired PricewaterhouseCoopers” (taxguru,
webpage; 2010).
Even with the current standards and guidance that are available for auditors, there are
obviously many shortcomings associated with them; otherwise, the auditing scandals,
such as those outlined in section 2.2, would not have occurred. Therefore, even though
audit firm rotation may not be the most appropriate answer to independence issues, as
is evidenced by the results of this study, it is believed that some derivative of audit
firm rotation, which is not as taxing on the auditors or their clients, would enhance an
auditors independence. A number of strategies of how this may be achieved are
proposed below.
5.4 Recommendations to improve this study
The researcher recommends that this research should be repeated and expanded to
include the entire population of accounting firms in Ireland, rather than just the top 20.
Also, the researcher would recommend interviews with the professional indemnifiers
of auditors, as these are who will be sought after, if legal action is taken against the
auditors for malpractice, misconduct or substandard auditing.
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5.5 Recommendations for further research
Many suggestions were put forward regarding the enhancement of an auditor’s
independence as outlined in section 4.2.6.5. The researcher believes that further
research could be conducted surrounding the areas of making a reduction in the 10%
threshold for fees relating to audit and non-audit services. Also, an investigation into
whether hot file reviews by an independent third party to improve the quality of the
auditors work, could be conducted.
Another subject that would merit further research would be the suggestion that
government bodies appoint the auditors for each company. It is believed that this
would strengthen independence given the fact that a client will have no say in whether
or not to retain their clients; therefore, the auditor will feel under no obligation or have
no incentive to issue a qualified report in order to retain their client.
In addition to this, further research could be conducted on ascertaining whether
auditors religiously apply the existing standards. Some of the authors of the literature
and the interviewees referred to how there are enough standards already in place to
ensure an auditor’s independence is unimpaired, however, time and time again there
are major corporate scandals that raise the question, ‘How independent is the auditor
from their client?’. Perhaps the existing standards are sufficient but maybe there
should be continuous monitoring to ensure that all auditors are in full compliance.
Overall this study has addressed the research question and provided a clear overview
of the opinions of the author. It is hoped that the findings of this research has added a
valuable insight to the stakeholders outlined in section 1.4 into how audit firm rotation
would impact on an auditors’ independence.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 - Survey Questions
This is a representation of the questions asked but the questionnaire was presented
through an on-line survey package available at www.surveymonkey.com to improve
presentation and user friendliness.
Should Audit Firm Rotation be introduced in Ireland?
1. Audit Firm Rotation
1. Which body is your accounting firm currently a member of?
Institute of Chartered Accountants (ICAI)
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA)
Certified Public Accountants (CPA)
Other (please specify)
2. In total, how many employees are working in your firm?
0-50
51-100
101-150
151-200
201-250
250+
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3. Based on company audit clients your firm served during last year, what is your
estimate of the average period for which the firm has served your company clients as
auditor?
0 years
1-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years
21-25 years
More than 25 years
In total, how many companies did your accounting firm serve as auditor last
year?
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4. In your opinion, how important are each of the following factors in affecting the
auditors ability to detect financial reporting issues that may indicate material
misstatement in a company's financial statements?
Please tick one section in each row.
Very Great
Importance
Great
Importance
Moderate
Importance
Some
Importance
Little or No
Importance
Appropriate staff
education, training
and experience
Appropriate
knowledge of
Generally
Accepted
Accounting
Principles (GAAP)
Appropriate
knowledge if
International
Auditing
Standards (IAS)
Appropriate audit
team staffing level
Appropriate firm
experience within
the company's
industry
Appropriate risk
assessment process
for the client
acceptance process
Appropriate
knowledge of the
client's operations,
systems and
financial reporting
practices
Appendix 1 - Survey Questionnaire
56
5. If there were mandatory audit firm rotation, how would you rank the following?
Significant
likelihood
Strong
likelihood
Moderate
likelihood
Little
likelihood No likelihood
The likelihood that
a new auditor
would detect
financial reporting
issues that may
materially affect a
company's
financial
statements.
The likelihood that
a new auditor is
likely to have
initially less
specific knowledge
of the clients
operations than the
previous auditor of
record.
The likelihood that
a new audit firm
(with less client
specific knowledge)
would not detect
material
misstatements in
the financial
statements during
the first year of the
auditors tenure?
Appendix 1 - Survey Questionnaire
57
6. How would you rate the pressure on your accounting firm and the engagement partner(s)
to retain clients as a factor in whether or not they appropriately deal with financial reporting
issues that may materially affect a company’s financial statements?
Significant
factor Strong factor
Moderate
factor Small factor No factor
Pressure on the
firm in the absence
of mandatory audit
firm rotation
Pressure on the
firm with
mandatory audit
firm rotation
Pressure on the
engagement
partner(s) in the
absence of
mandatory audit
firm rotation
Pressure on the
engagement
partner(s) with
mandatory audit
firm rotation
7. In your opinion, how would establishing a limit on an accounting firm’s tenure as a
company’s auditor affect the perception of the auditor’s independence held by the
following:
Significantly
increase
Somewhat
increase
Neither
increase nor
decrease
Somewhat
decrease
Significantly
decrease
Perceptions of
auditor
independence held
by capital markets
Perceptions of
auditor
independence held
by institutional
investors
Perceptions of
auditor
independence held
by individual
investors
8. Do you agree with the following statements?
Strongly agree Generallyagree
Neither agree
nor disagree
Generally
disagree
Strongly
disagree
The risk of an
audit failure is
higher in the early
years of an audit
tenure period as
the new accounting
firm is more likely
to have not fully
developed and
applied an in depth
understanding of
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Strongly agree Generallyagree
Neither agree
nor disagree
Generally
disagree
Strongly
disagree
the new client’s
operations and
financial reporting
practices.
The risk of an
audit failure is
higher in the early
years of an audit
tenure period
because the new
accounting firm is
more likely to place
heavy reliance on
information
provided by client
management.
The risk of an
audit failure is
likely to increase as
the audit tenure
period increases
due to the “comfort
level” (familiarity
with client
management and
the desire to retain
the client over
many years)
provided by the
public accounting
firm’s long-term
relationship with
client management.
In the first year of
an audit, an
accounting firms
costs significantly
exceed the firms
subsequent annual
audit costs.
The risk of an
audit failure is
likely to increase as
the audit tenure
period increases
due to client
management
becoming too
familiar with the
auditor’s approach
and procedures.
9. If mandatory rotation of accounting firms were required....
Three to four years Five to seven years Eight to ten years Greater than 10years
What should be the
limit on the
Appendix 1 - Survey Questionnaire
59
Three to four years Five to seven years Eight to ten years Greater than 10years
number of years an
accounting firm
can audit any one
entity?
After what period
of time should the
incumbent firm be
permitted to once
again compete for
audit services?
10. Do you have any other suggestions on how an auditor’s independence
can be improved?
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Appendix 2
Draft Interview Questions
This list of questions were not rigidly followed, meaning that the interviewer
could adapt his technique to suit each individual interview depending on the
interviewee’s circumstances and their initial responses.
1. If mandatory rotation of accounting firms were required, what should be the
limit on the incumbent firm’s audit tenure period?
2. If mandatory rotation of accounting firms were required, after what period of
time should the incumbent firm be permitted to once again compete for audit
services?
3. If mandatory rotation of accounting firms were required, should it be
implemented over a period of years (staggered) on a reasonable basis to avoid a
significant number of companies changing auditors simultaneously?
4. If mandatory rotation of accounting firms were required, do you believe such a
requirement should be applied uniformly for audits of all companies regardless
of the nature or size of the company?
5. Overall, what do you think the benefits are of introducing mandatory audit firm
rotation in Ireland? Drawbacks?
6. If mandatory audit firm rotation was introduced, do you think that the “fresh
look” that new audit firms are said to provide would benefit the client more
rather than the associated costs?
7. If mandatory audit firm rotation came in, how do you think the new accounting
firm’s initial level of knowledge of the client’s specific operations and financial
reporting practices compare to the previous auditor of record’s level of
knowledge of the client’s operations and financial reporting processes?
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8. Do you think that there is pressure on an accounting firm to retain clients as a
factor in whether or not they appropriately deal with financial reporting issues
that may materially affect a company’s financial statements, especially in
today’s economic climate?
9. In your opinion, how would establishing a limit on an accounting firm’s tenure
as a company’s auditor affect the perception of the auditor’s independence by
capital markets, institutional investors and individual investors?
10. It has been said that there is a higher risk of being able to uncover any issues in
the earlier years of an auditors tenure as the new firm may not have fully
developed and applied an in depth understanding and financial reporting
practices. Do you agree with this?
Do you think this would lead to under auditing in certain areas due to the fact
that the auditor may place more reliance on management representations?
11. In contrast, do you think the client that an audit firm may become complacent
as the audit tenure period increases due to the “comfort level” that may exist
after a long-term relationship with their client’s management?
And could there be a fear that management may become too familiar with the
auditor’s approach and procedures giving them scope to mislead the auditor?
12. At the moment, it is between 5 and 10 top accounting firms that do the audits
for the PLC’s! If mandatory audit firm rotation was introduced would this
increase this number? Would more of the mid-tier firms get some of the bigger
audits?
(Expand Big 4 into Top 20)
13. Do you have any other suggestions on how an auditor’s independence can be
improved?
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